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Spatial and Topological Interdiction for
Transmission Systems
Kaarthik Sundar∗, Sidhant Misra†, Russell Bent†, Feng Pana
Abstract—This paper presents novel formulations and algo-
rithms for the N -k interdiction problem in transmission net-
works. In particular, it models two new classes of N -k attacks:
(i) Spatial N -k attacks where the attack is constrained to be
within a specified distance of a bus chosen by an attacker and
(ii) Topological N -k attacks where the attack is constrained
to connected components. These two specific types of N -k
attacks compute interdiction plans designed to better model
localized attacks, such as those induced by natural disasters
or physical attacks. We formulate each of these problems as
bilevel, max-min optimization problems and present an algorithm
to solve these formulations. Detailed case studies analyzing the
behavior of these interdiction problems and comparing them
to the traditional worst-case N -k interdiction problem are also
presented.
Index Terms—N -k interdiction, power grids, Stackleberg
game, coordinated attacks, penalty method
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power transmission grid plays an important
and critical role in sustaining the socioeconomic systems that
modern society depends on. Recent events, including natural
disasters and intentional physical attacks on the grid, illustrate
the need for methods that identify small sets of components
whose failure leads to significant system impacts. One model
that identifies such sets is the N -k interdiction problem [22].
The interdiction problem seeks to identify k components in
the system whose simultaneous or near-simultaneous failure
causes the worst case disruption to the grid, where disruption
is typically measured through load shed. This problem is
often modeled as a bilevel, Stackelberg game (see [7]) with
an attacker and a defender. The attacker’s and defender’s
actions are sequential and the attacker has a perfect model
of how the defender will optimally respond to an attack.
The objective of the attacker is to identify k components
whose loss maximizes the minimum load that a defender must
shed in response to the simultaneous or near-simultaneous
failure of those components. In this problem, N and k re-
fer to the total number of components and the number of
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attacked components, respectively. The number of possible N -
k contingencies, even for small values of k, makes complete
enumeration computationally intractable.
The motivation of the paper stems from the fact that
the current adversarial models in the literature assume the
adversary or the attacker is all powerful and can interdict
different parts of the system simultaneously, even if they have
large geographic separation. The focus of this paper is to
develop novel interdiction formulations that model a resource
constrained adversary that is more reflective of reality and
illustrate the value of modeling such adversaries by comparing
them to the traditional models in the literature. In particu-
lar, we formulate models where the attacker is constrained
either topologically or spatially as such scenarios encompass
many practical situations such as coordinated physical attacks,
hurricanes and earthquakes1. We stress that the techniques
presented in this paper are general and are extendable to other
formulations of resource constrained adversaries.
Over the last ten years, there has been considerable progress
in modeling and developing algorithm to solve the deter-
ministic and probabilistic variants of the N -k problem with
approaches ranging from exact (computing an optimal N -k
interdiction) to heuristic. Here, we present an overview of the
literature for the deterministic N -k interdiction problem and
refer interested readers to [24] for detailed literature review of
probabilistic variants. We start by reviewing the literature on
variants of the N -k interdiction problem that use the DC power
flow equations and develop exact approaches for solving the
problem. The first work is by Salmeron et al. [21] where a
bilevel formulation for the problem is presented. A Benders
decomposition algorithm based on this formulation was devel-
oped in [1] and tested on small instances. The inner problem
in [21] is replaced by its dual in [19] and is approximated
using KKT conditions in [3]. The first work to systematically
develop a decomposition algorithm to solve the N -k problem
based on Benders decomposition on large test instances is
[22]. The algorithm developed in [22] was tested on a “U.S.
Regional Grid” with 5000 buses, 5000 lines, and 500 gen-
1We do not assume a natural event is intelligent. In this context, k is used
to model the expected number of components that fail during a natural event.
The interdiction problem determines the components that could fail under that
assumption and lead to the worst outcome.
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erators. The works in [1], [22] measure disruption in terms
of long-term power shedding, ignoring short-term shedding
resulting from cascading outages immediately after the attack,
and use a DC power flow model to compute this long-term
power shedding. More recently, [5] develops computationally
efficient algorithms to solve a minimum cardinality variant of
the N -k problem, where the objective is to find a minimum
cardinality attack with a throughput less than a pre-specified
bound. They also formulate and solve a nonlinear continuous
version of the problem where the attacker is allowed to change
the transmission line parameters to disrupt the system instead
of removing transmission lines. The authors in [11] study the
N -k problem where the system operator is allowed to use both
load shedding and line switching as defensive operations via
a Benders decomposition algorithm.
The literature has also developed interdiction models that
use AC power flow formulations and heuristic approaches
that are scalable to larger instances. For example, [17] and
[12], [20] have used the AC power flow equations and ap-
proximations to these equations, respectively, in interdiction
modeling. Examples of heuristic approaches include [6] and
[2]. Finally, there is literature on the related problem of contin-
gency identification (see [10], [14], [15], [23] and references
therein). In particular, [15] develops a heuristic approach to
identify multiple contingencies that can initiate cascades on
large transmission systems, and [10] uses current injection-
based methods and “line outage distribution factors” to identify
high consequence contingencies. This work in the literature
focuses on using a variety of “criticality” measures, based
on the DC power flow model, for the different components
in the system that aid in identifying these contingencies. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature
that considers interdiction problems with spatial proximity or
topological connectivity restrictions. The contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
• The paper develops novel models of the N -k interdiction
problem based on topological connectivity and spatial
proximity,
• presents a generic constraint-generation algorithm that
works for any variant of the N -k interdiction problem
on power grids,
• corroborates the effectiveness and scalability of the algo-
rithm on standard test instances, and,
• examines the results from the case studies in comparison
with the traditional N -k interdiction problem.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section presents a bilevel, mixed-integer linear program
for a general N -k interdiction problem and then specializes
the formulation to model topological connectivity and spatial
proximity restrictions. For ease of exposition, we assume that
only transmission lines are interdicted, though the formula-
tions and algorithms extend to the general case where any
component in the transmission system can be interdicted. We
first present the nomenclature and terminology that we use
throughout the rest of the paper. Unless otherwise stated, all
the values are in per-unit (pu).
Sets:
N - set of buses (nodes) in the network
N(i) - set of nodes connected to bus i by an edge
E - set of edges (lines) in the network
E(i) - set of edges in E connected to bus i and oriented from
i
Er(i) - set of edges in E connected to bus i and oriented to i
Variables:
θi - phase angle at bus i
pgi - active power generated at bus i
`i - percent active power (load) shed at bus i
pij - active power flow on line (i, j)
xij - binary interdiction variable for line (i, j)
δij - auxiliary flow variable for each line (i, j)
yi - auxiliary binary variable for bus i ∈ N
x - vector of interdiction variables xij
Constants:
pdi - active power demand at bus i
bij - susceptance of line (i, j)
(0,pi) - bounds for active power generated at bus i
tij - thermal limit of line (i, j)
k - number of interdicted components
D - planar distance limit
For a value (·), we use the notation (·)+ (·)− as shorthand for
max{0, (·)} and −min{0, (·)}, respectively Using the above
set of notations, the N -k interdiction problem is formulated
as follows:
(F) max
x∈X
η (x) (1)
where,
(LS(x)) η(x) = min
∑
i∈N
pdi `i subject to: (2a)
pgi − (1− `i)pdi =
∑
(i,j)∈E(i)
pij −
∑
(j,i)∈Er(i)
pji ∀i ∈ N,
(2b)
0 6 pgi 6 pi ∀i ∈ N, (2c)
−Mxij 6 pij + bij(θi − θj) 6Mxij ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2d)
− tij(1− xij) 6 pij 6 tij(1− xij) ∀(i, j) ∈ E (2e)
0 6 `i 6 1 ∀i ∈ N. (2f)
where M =
∑
i∈N p
d
i . For the traditional N -k interdiction
problem, the set X is given by {x : ∑(i,j)∈E xij = k}.
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Additional restrictions on the set X enforce topological con-
nectivity or spatial proximity restrictions on the N -k inter-
diction plans. The inner problem is a linear program for a
fixed interdiction plan. It formulates a minimum load shedding
problem using the DC power flow constraints. Constraints (2d)
and (2e) are functions of the interdiction variables x. We
remark that this model does not shed load that is co-located
with a generator because the model only interdicts lines. To
achieve this effect, buses can be split into separate generator
and load bus with no geographic distance. Alternatively, bus
interdiction variables can be included in the formulation to
shed loads that are co-located with generators in the same
bus.
A. Spatial N -k Interdiction
This model enforces the attacker to choose k lines and a bus
i such that the k lines are within a planar distance of D2 units
from the bus i. This enforces the interdicted lines to be within
a planar distance of D units of one another. Instances of this
kind of an interdiction plan include natural disasters which
are localized, localized cyber attacks, and physical attacks. To
formulate the problem, we use ϕij to denote the set of all
buses within a planar distance, D2 , of line (i, j). Given ϕij
for each line (i, j), the set X for spatial N -k interdiction is
modeled as:∑
(i,j)∈E
xij 6 k,
∑
i∈N
xi = 1 (3a)
xij 6
∑
n∈ϕij
xn ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (3b)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E, xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N. (3c)
Constraints (3a) ensure (i) at most k components are in-
terdicted and (ii) exactly one bus is selected. Unlike the
traditional interdiction, the spatial interdiction problem may
not contain a feasible interdiction plan with exactly k lines
removed. This may occur when D is very small and there
are less than k components of the transmission system in the
region of impact. Without loss of generality, if the location of
the event’s bus is known, then the binary variable for that bus
can explicitly be set to one. Finally, constraints (3b) ensure
that all the interdicted components lie within the circle of
radius D2 units centered around the chosen bus. Alternately,
this condition can be restated as every interdicted component
is within a distance of D units from each other and within a
distance of D2 units from the chosen bus.
B. Topological N -k Interdiction
The spatial N -k interdiction assumes that a damaging
event’s region of impact is circular and aims at finding
the worst-case N -k attack within this circular footprint. But
damaging events like tornadoes, hurricanes, etc. may not be
circular or even regularly shaped. Furthermore, spatial data
might not be available in many cases. Hence, as a proxy, the
topological N -k interdiction considers connected components,
i.e., it computes a worst-case connected N -k attack. To formu-
late the connectivity constraints, we use a single-commodity
flow formulation [18] by introducing a “super sink” bus (κ)
that is connected to every bus in the network. κ serves as a
source of k+1 units of flow that are carried to all the buses in
the network that are incident on at least one interdicted line.
Flow variables δij for each (i, j) ∈ E determine the amount
of flow carried on the interdicted edges. The set X for the
topological N -k interdiction is modified as follows:∑
(i,j)∈E
xij = k,
∑
i∈N
xκi = 1, (4a)
xij 6 yi, xij 6 yj ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (4b)
δκi 6 (k + 1) · xκi ∀i ∈ N, (4c)
δij 6 k · xij ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (4d)∑
(j,i)∈Er(i)
δji −
∑
(i,j)∈E(i)
δij = yi − δκi ∀i ∈ N, (4e)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (4f)
− k 6 δij 6 k ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (4g)
yi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N. (4h)
Constraint (4a) ensures that the number of interdicted lines
is k and that a dummy edge originating from κ is chosen to
ensure flow is delivered to the buses incident on interdicted
lines. Constraints (4b) enforce the auxiliary binary variables
yi and yj to take value 1 if the line (i, j) is interdicted. The
constraints from (4c)–(4e) are single-commodity flow con-
straints and ensure that the interdicted lines form a connected
component. Intuitively, the single commodity flow formulation
ensures that each bus incident on an interdicted line receives
one unit of flow from κ. In the next section, we develop
a penalty-based constraint-generation algorithm to solve the
bilevel problems to optimality.
III. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
This section describes a constraint-generation algorithm that
works directly with the bilevel structure of the interdiction
problem and does not dualize the inner problem. We begin by
first presenting a reformulation of the inner problem LS(x).
A. Reformulation of the interdiction problem
The reformulation we propose assumes that LS(x) is fea-
sible for all x ∈ X . This is a reasonable assumption because
the operator can shed all load in the system to make the inner
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problem feasible. The reformulation depends on the following
property of linear programs.
Lemma 1. Consider a linear program of the following form
(P1) : min{c · z : Az 6 b, z > 0} (5)
that has a finite optimum. Let α denotes the vector of dual
variables that correspond to the constraints Az 6 b. Let α¯
be a bound on the optimal dual variables α∗. Consider the
following optimization problem:
(P2) : min{c · z + α¯ · (Az − b)+ : z > 0} (6)
Then the optimal values of (P1) and (P2) and are identical.
Proof. The proof follows by taking the dual of (P1), adding
the valid inequality α 6 α¯ and taking the dual again.
For a fixed interdiction plan x ∈ X , we use
(µ1ij(x), µ
2
ij(x)) and (pi
1
ij(x), pi
2
ij(x)) to denote the optimal
dual variables for constraints (2d) and (2e), respectively. The
notation (µ¯1ij(x), µ¯
2
ij(x)) and (p¯i
1
ij(x), p¯i
2
ij(x)) denotes the
upper bounds of of the dual variables over each x ∈ X . By
Lemma 1, the inner problem is equivalent to
ηr(x) = min
∑
i∈N
pdi `i +
∑
(i,j)∈E

µ¯1ij(x)[pij + bij(θi − θj)−Mxij ]+ +
µ¯2ij(x)[Mxij − pij − bij(θi − θj)]−+
p¯i1ij(x)[pij − tij(1− xij)]+ +
p¯i2ij(x)[tij(1− xij)− pij ]−

(7a)
subject to: Eqs (2b), (2c), (2f),
−M 6 pij + bij(θi − θj) 6M ∀(i, j) ∈ E, (7b)
− tij 6 pij 6 tij ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (7c)
This reformulation is a variant of “penalty methods” used to
solve non-linear optimization problems [4]. Since xij ∈ {0, 1},
the objective in (7a) is equivalent to
ηr(x) = min
∑
i∈N
pdi `i +
∑
(i,j)∈E

µ¯1ij(x)[pij + bij(θi − θj)]+(1− xij) +
µ¯2ij(x)[pij + bij(θi − θj)]−(1− xij) +
p¯i1ij(x)p
+
ijxij + p¯i
2
ij(x)p
−
ijxij

(8)
Our proposed constraint generation approach is based on esti-
mating the dual upper bounds µ1ij(x), µ
2
ij(x), pi
1
ij(x), pi
2
ij(x).
A similar approach was used in [9] where the authors found
a constant upper bound of 1 for every dual variable; their
approach is valid for the special case they consider where the
inner problem is a standard network flow problem. In this
paper, we propose to use a piece-wise constant upper bound
one pair of dual variables, µ1ij(x), µ
2
ij(x) that is based on the
following observation.
Lemma 2. For any interdiction plan x ∈ X where X models
a traditional, topological or spatial interdiction problem, the
optimal dual values, µ1ij(x) and µ
2
ij(x) satisfy
µ1ij(x) = µ
2
ij(x) = 0, whenever xij = 1. (9)
Proof. The proof follows by applying complementary slack-
ness condition to the constraints (2d). Whenever xij = 1, the
value of pij + bij(θi − θj) must lie in (−M ,M) i.e., the
constraints are never tight. Therefore, the corresponding dual
variables must be zero.
Exploiting the property in Lemma 2, the objective in Eq.
(8) now reduces to
ηr(x) = min
∑
i∈N
pdi `i +
∑
(i,j)∈E
(p¯i1ij(x)p
+
ij + p¯i
2
ij(x)p
−
ij) · xij .
Choosing constant dual upper bound values of (p¯i1ij , p¯i
2
ij)
for (p¯i1ij(x), p¯i
2
ij(x)), respectively, we obtain the following
equivalent formulation of the full interdiction problem:
(F1) max
x∈X
η subject to: (10a)
η 6
∑
i∈N
pdi `i(x) +
∑
(i,j)∈E
(p¯i1ijp
+
ij(x) + p¯i
2
ijp
−
ij(x))xij
(10b)
where, `i(x), p+ij(x), and p
−
ij(x) are the optimal load shed
values, i ∈ N, and the positive and negative parts of the active
power flow on each transmission line of the network for a
fixed N -k attack defined by x.
B. Constraint generation algorithm
The formulation in Eq. (10) is solved using a constraint
generation algorithm that alternates between solving the outer
maximization problem in Eq. (1) and the inner problem LS(x).
Constraints of the form (10b) are generated at each iteration.
It first relaxes all the constraints in Eq. (10b) from (10) and
solves the resulting problem to obtain an upper bound to
the optimal objective value of the interdiction problem. This
solution obtained is then used to solve the inner problem
i.e., a minimum load shedding problem with the components
in the current solution removed. The optimal load shedding
factors and active power flow on each line are then used
to add a cut of the form (10b). The constraint-generation
algorithm generates the constraints in (10b) dynamically until
an optimality tolerance is reached. At each iteration of the
constraint-generation algorithm, in addition to the constraint
in step 10 of Algorithm 1, we also add the following no-good
cut in Eq. (11). These no-good cuts eliminate the selection
of the same interdiction plan in the outer problem after it
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is selected once. The cuts have been observed to improve
the convergence behaviour of the algorithm for the traditional
interdiction problems [22].∑
(i,j)∈E
xˆij · xij 6 k − 1. (11)
For the sake of clarity, a pseudo-code of the algorithm is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Constraint-generation algorithm
Input: optimality tolerance, ε > 0
Output: x∗ ∈ X , an ε-optimal N -k attack
1: initial problem: F1 without constraint (10b)
2: η∗ ← −∞ . lower bound on the optimal obj. value
3: ηu ← +∞ . upper bound on the optimal obj. value
4: xˆ any initial N -k attack
5: solve inner problem for xˆ
6: η(xˆ)← the load shed for the attack defined by xˆ
7: `i(xˆ)← active load shed factor for xˆ and ∀i ∈ N
8: pij(xˆ)← active power through line (i, j) ∈ E
9: if η(xˆ) > η∗ then η∗ ← η(xˆ) and x∗ ← xˆ
10: add η 6 η(xˆ) +
∑
(i,j)∈E(p¯i
1
ijp
+
ij(xˆ) + p¯i
2
ijp
−
ij(xˆ)) · xij to
F1 and resolve the outer problem
11: update xˆ, and set ηu using solution from Step 10
12: if ηu − η∗ 6 εη∗ then (x∗, η∗) is the ε-optimal solution
to the interdiction problem, stop
13: Add no-good cut (11)
14: return to step: 5
C. Choosing bounds on the dual variables
We also note that tight upper bounds on the optimal dual
values over all N -k attacks i.e., p¯i1ij and p¯i
2
ij for each line
(i, j) ∈ E are essential to obtain a reasonable convergence
behaviour. A trivial and valid value for the dual upper bounds
for any line (i, j) ∈ E is the total load in the system i.e., p¯i1ij =
p¯i2ij =
∑
i∈N p
d
i . Intuitively, the tightest value of the dual upper
bounds specify the minimum amount of load that can be served
by increasing the thermal limit of the corresponding line by
one unit over all N -k attacks. Given this interpretation, the
total load is a very conservative choice for the p¯i1ij and p¯i
2
ij . In
the subsequent paragraphs, we focus on (i) finding lines for
which p¯i1ij = 0 or p¯i
2
ij = 0 and (ii) heuristic choices of dual
upper bounds.
Let E¯ denote the lines (i, j) ∈ E in the transmission network
that are never congested (i.e., the constraint (7c) is never tight)
for any feasible interdiction plan x ∈ X . Then, for any (i, j) ∈
E¯, we know that p¯i1ij = p¯i
2
ij = 0. The lines for which pij < tij
for any x ∈ X have p¯i1ij = 0 and lines that always satisfy
pij > −tij for any x ∈ X , p¯i2ij = 0. It remains to compute
the lines that satisfy these conditions for any interdiction plan.
To that end, for each line, we solve the following pair of
linear programs which aid in finding the lines that are never
congested for any feasible x ∈ X:
max±pij subject to: (12a)
Eq. (2b) – (2f), x ∈ X and 0 6 xij 6 1.
If the maximum value of pij (−pij) is less than tij , then
p¯i1ij (p¯i
2
ij) takes a value zero i.e., the line is never congested in
any interdiction plan x ∈ X . For the remaining lines, we set
p¯i1ij = p¯i
2
ij =
∑
i∈N p
d
i . This choice of dual upper bounds can
still be weak for systems with a large total load value. Hence,
we also examine heuristic choices of the dual upper bounds.
In particular, we use p¯i1ij = p¯i
2
ij = 1 for all lines (i, j) ∈ E.
This is a valid bound for the transportation model, i.e., the
inner problem LS(x) without the constraints (2d). Intuitively,
these upper bounds have the following interpretation: if a line
(i, j) ∈ E is removed from a network, then the maximum
amount of load that is shed is the absolute value of the power
flowing on the line. This is not always true because of Braess’
paradox [22]. Nevertheless, if the total load shed induced by
the removal of any subset of lines Eˆ in the network does not
incur more than
∑
(i,j)∈E |pij | load shed, then p¯i1ij = p¯i2ij = 1 is
a valid set of upper bounds for the optimal dual variables over
all feasible interdiction plans x ∈ X . Indeed, we see in our
experiments in the next section that the choice p¯i1ij = p¯i
2
ij = 1
is valid for the test cases we consider.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present two case studies to demonstrate
the computational effectiveness of the constraint-generation
algorithm in computing an optimal N -k interdiction plan. The
case studies are performed on two PGLib-OPF v18.08 [25]
API test cases: the IEEE single-area RTS96 with 24 buses and
the geolocated WECC 240 with 240 buses. The IEEE single-
area RTS96 test system is artificially geolocated in the state
of Utah. The k values for both the spatial and the topological
interdiction problems are varied from 2 to 6. All of the
interdiction formulations and algorithms were implemented in
Julia v0.6 using the optimization modeling layer JuMP.jl v0.18
[13] and PowerModels v0.8 [8]. Furthermore, an optimality
tolerance of ε = 1% was used as a termination criteria.
A. Computational performance and choice of dual bounds
Fig. 1 shows the number of iterations the constraint-
generation algorithm needs to converge to an ε-optimal solu-
tion on the RTS96 single-area system with valid and heuristic
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dual upper bounds for the spatial and topological N -k inter-
diction problems. For this set of experiments on the RTS96
test system D was set to 10 km. From Fig. 1 it is clear that the
computational performance of the algorithm is superior when
the heuristic dual upper bounds are used. Despite the lack of
a proof of validity for these bounds, they still yield optimal
solutions to the interdiction problems. Hence, throughout the
rest of the paper, heuristic dual upper bounds are used for all
experiments.
2 3 4 5 6
101
102
103
k
ite
rt
io
ns
Spatial (V) Spatial (H)
Topological (V) Topological (H)
Fig. 1. Number of iterations required to converge to an ε-optimal solution
with valid (V) and heuristic (H) dual upper bounds for the spatial and the
topological N -k interdiction problem.
Table I shows the ε-optimal load shed values, computation
time, number of iterations, and the relative optimality gap
for the traditional, spatial (with D = 10 km) and topolog-
ical interdiction problems for varying values of k. Table II
shows the same for the WECC 240 test system. These tables
corroborates the effectiveness of the algorithm in computing
ε-optimal solutions with very little computational effort.
B. Value of realistic attacker models
From Tables I and II we observe that the load shed obtained
using the traditional N -k interdiction formulation is much
higher than those obtained from the spatial and the topological
interdiction problems. This is because the traditional N -k
permits the attacker to interdict components in the system
that are geographically far apart in the transmission system.
This however is less realistic and as shown by the results can
significantly overestimate the required load shed values.
This phenomenon is demonstrated in the spatial interdiction
model by examining the impact of parameter D on the load
shed values. To that end, we let D take any value from 100km
to 1000km in steps of 100km. Fig. 2 shows the load shed
values for various values of D and k. The load shed for fixed
values of k is observed to quickly increase with D (and will
converge to the load-shed value for the traditional N − k
TABLE I
RESULTS COMPARING THE DIFFERENT INTERDICTION MODELS ON THE
IEEE SINGLE-AREA RTS96 TEST SYSTEM. AS k GETS LARGER, THE
EFFECT OF CONSTRAINING THE ATTACKER GROWS CONSIDERABLY. THE
LOAD SHED VALUES OBTAINED USING A TRADITIONAL APPROACH FOR
DETERMINING THE INTERDICTION CAN BE AS MUCH AS 50% MORE THAN
A SPATIALLY CONSTRAINED ATTACKER.
k
load shed time iterations opt. gap(p.u) (sec.) (%)
Traditional N -k interdiction
2 4.0 4.42 21 0.00
3 7.37 3.45 15 0.50
4 11.05 3.43 11 0.33
5 14.21 2.96 10 0.86
6 15.96 3.43 13 0.00
Spatial N -k interdiction
2 4.0 2.76 20 0.00
3 6.3 2.56 20 0.00
4 8.0 2.44 19 0.70
5 9.59 2.97 25 0.00
6 11.0 2.38 19 0.00
Topological N -k interdiction
2 4.0 4.39 11 0.00
3 6.29 4.10 11 0.24
4 7.72 5.31 19 0.00
5 11.05 4.85 11 0.00
6 11.05 20.09 35 0.00
formulation when D is sufficiently large), thus establishing the
importance of a more accurate attacker model. Fig. 3 shows
the number of iterations needed by the constraint-generation
algorithm to converge to an ε-optimal solution for the spatial
N -k interdiction problem. The plot suggests that the difficulty
of the problem does not increase or decrease substantially with
the value of the parameter D and for a fixed value of k.
The final set of plots in Fig. 4 shows locations where
the load is shed for the WECC 240 test system by the
traditional (see Fig. 4a), spatial with D = 500 km (see
Fig. 4b), and topological (see Fig. 4c) interdiction models,
respectively for k = 6. As observed from Fig. 4, the traditional
interdiction problem has the ability to compute N -k attacks
where the components interdicted have a large geographical
separation. As a result, the attack produces a load shed in
geographically different parts of the system. Both the spatial
and the topological N -k models result in N -k attacks where
the load shed is more localized to a particular region indicative
of the fact that the topological N -k model serves as a proxy
for the spatial interdiction problem in the absence of spatial
grid data.
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TABLE II
RESULTS COMPARING THE DIFFERENT INTERDICTION MODELS ON THE
WECC 240 TEST SYSTEM. AS k GETS LARGER, THE EFFECT OF
CONSTRAINING THE ATTACKER GROWS CONSIDERABLY. THE
TRADITIONAL APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE INTERDICTION CAN BE
ALMOST 200% MORE THAN A CONSTRAINED ATTACKER. INTERESTINGLY,
CONSTRAINING THE ATTACKER ALSO HAS THE SIDE EFFECT OF REDUCING
THE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR CONVERGENCE.
k
load shed time iterations opt. gap(p.u) (sec.) (%)
Traditional N -k interdiction
2 219.19 3.71 14 0.00
3 331.8 4.9 19 0.00
4 418.89 4.64 16 0.06
5 482.22 7.48 24 0.80
6 556.65 5.63 18 0.77
Spatial N -k interdiction
2 192.22 3.03 5 0.00
3 222.65 3.59 7 0.00
4 233.99 5.22 11 0.57
5 255.73 4.98 10 0.94
6 273.68 7.15 16 0.0
Topological N -k interdiction
2 121.26 5.52 5 0.40
3 211.26 5.52 4 0.00
4 222.49 9.72 5 0.88
5 233.4 41.64 12 0.00
6 332.03 21.27 6 0.00
D = 200 km
D = 600 km
D = 1000 km
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
k = 5
k = 6
load
sh
ed
(p
.u
.)
0
100
200
300
400
Fig. 2. Load shed, in p.u., for the spatial interdiction problem for varying
values of k and D on the WECC 240 test system.
D = 200 km
D = 600 km
D = 1000 km
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
k = 5
k = 6
iteration
s
0
10
20
30
40
Fig. 3. Number of iterations of the constraint-generation algorithm for the
spatial interdiction problem for varying values of k and D on the WECC 240
test system.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents two N -k interdiction models that con-
strain the capabilities of the attacker to better model localized
interdiction. These models use spatial proximity and topologi-
cal connectivity for formulate localized interdiction. A general
constraint-generation algorithm was developed to handle a
broad class of interdiction problems and was demonstrated
these localized interdiction formulations and the traditional
interdiction models. Case studies on the IEEE RTS 96 and
WECC 240 systems show the computational effectiveness of
the algorithm and the effectiveness of the model in identifying
attacks that are localized.
There are number of potentially interesting future directions
for this work. First, new models of constraining the attack
model to better reflect the capabilities and outcomes of ex-
treme events, such as those based on stochastic N −k models
could be developed [24]. Second, these localized models
could be connected to AC power flow models, such as the
convex relaxations developed in [16], to improve the realism
of the chosen attacks. Finally, it would also be interesting to
develop methods for deriving stronger valid bounds on the
dual variables.
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(a) Load shed = 556.65 p.u. (b) Load shed = 273.68 p.u (c) Load shed = 332.03 p.u.
Fig. 4. Map of the buses where the load is shed for the (a) traditional, (b) spatial, and (c) topological interdiction problems with k = 6. The radius of the
each of the circles centered around a bus represents the percentage of total load shed in that bus. The interdicted lines are shown in red. All the buses on
which the interdicted lines are incident on are highlighted using red boxes. We also remark that some of the interdicted lines in all the three figures connect
buses that are very close to each other and hence is not highlighted in red, and hence the reason for highlighting the buses on which the lines are incident
on. For the spatial interdiction problem, the value of D was set to 500 km.
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